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The Methodological Standpoint of the  
“économie des conventions” 
Rainer Diaz-Bone ∗ 
Abstract: »Der methodologische Standpunkt der ‘économie des conventions’«. 
The article presents the methodological position of the French approach of the 
“économie des conventions” (economics of convention, in short: EC). EC is 
introduced as a new form of a pragmatist institutionalism, which assumes ca-
pable actors, a plurality of conventions and different forms of rationality. EC 
explains collective quality constructions and regards conventions as solutions 
for collectives to deal with uncertainty. EC criticizes mainstream economics 
because of its notion of rationality and its methodological individualism. The 
article focuses on the methodological standpoint of EC. It is argued that the 
influences from pragmatism and structuralism place this new institutionalism 
beyond pragmatism and structuralism and that its methodological position can 
be regarded as a “complex pragmatic situationalism”. The situation is the unit 
of analysis. In situations pluralities of conventions have an impact as possible 
logics of coordination and evaluation. The EC has a strong tradition in empiri-
cal historical analysis of institutional forms and socio-cognitive categories. It is 
argued that parallels to the Weberian methodology exist. But EC supposes that 
ideal types are common knowledge also to the ordinary actors. At the end it is 
the specific complex methodological position of EC that places it also beyond 
the opposition of methodological individualism and methodological holism. 
Keywords: économie des conventions, institutionalism, economic sociology, 
pragmatism, structuralism, socio-cognition, actor-network-theory, collective 
cognitive dispositives, Max Weber, Luc Boltanski, Laurent Thévenot, Robert 
Salais, Pierre Bourdieu. 
1. Introduction 
The French approach of the économie des conventions (in short: EC) can be 
regarded as a new institutionalism for the social and historical analysis of the 
plurality of action frameworks in economic worlds (Storper and Salais 1997).1 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Rainer Diaz-Bone, Soziologisches Seminar, Universität 
Luzern, Frohburgstrasse 3, Postfach 4466, 6002 Luzern, Switzerland;  
e-mail: rainer.diazbone@unilu.ch. 
I would like to thank Christian Bessy and Robert Salais for commenting a former version of 
this article. 
1  For a short introduction (German) to this approach in this journal see Diaz-Bone (2009a). 
See also the volumes of Thévenot (ed.) (1986), Salais and Thévenot (eds.) (1986),  
Boltanski and Thévenot (eds.) (1989), Salais, Chatel, and Rivaud-Danset (eds.) (1998), 
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The EC-approach was developed as a transdisciplinary institutionalism which 
integrates economical, sociological and historical perspectives.2 In this contri-
bution the methodological standpoint of EC will be discussed. It is argued that 
EC combines pragmatist positions with structuralist perspectives.3 Also EC 
collapses the opposition of methodological individualism (in short: MI) and 
methodological holism (in short: MH)4 in an innovative way. Therefore, the 
methodological standpoint can be regarded as a complex pragmatist situation-
alism.5 The development of this new methodological position was prepared 
through by the reception of pragmatism and the later structuralist sociology of 
Pierre Bourdieu. Both enable the EC-approach to develop a third way between 
MI and MH. 
In this contribution the notion of methodological standpoint is used to de-
note a broader understanding of methodology. As Herbert Blumer (1969) has 
shown, a complete social science approach (as symbolic interactionism) entails 
not only research techniques and instruments for data analysis. To work out a 
methodological standpoint means to start from its theoretical concepts which 
include assumptions of the ontological reality of the social world. An empirical 
approach has to consider the theoretical assumptions “on what there is” and 
how this is observable. In order to be coherent, the practice of empirical social 
research has to take these assumptions into account in its instrumental and 
interpretational aspects. Thus, methodology can be conceived as that realm of 
an approach which develops coherent strategies for empirical research. So, one 
can speak of another kind of holism: methodic holism. Here the term methodic 
holism is used to distinguish it from the notion of methodological holism. The 
latter denotes a logic of explanation – while the former denotes the relation of 
theory and the methods which are suitable for the research driven by this the-
ory. Methodic holism means the existing coherence between (a) theoretical 
assumptions about the ontology of the social, (b) the empirical research strate-
gies how to access social practices/social structures and (c) the deployed re-
search instruments of data gathering and data interpretation. In order to produce 
                                                                                                                                
Storper and Salais (1997), Favereau and Lazega (eds.) (2002), Orléan (ed.) (2004) and Ey-
mard-Duvernay (ed.) (1987, 2006a, 2006b). 
2  See for systematic presentations of the institutional argumentations (Diaz-Bone 2009a), 
Bessy (2002a, 2011), Bessy and Favereau (2003), Storper and Salais (1997). 
3  This perspective is also offered by Lazega and Favereau (2002). 
4  MH sometimes is denoted also as methodological collectivism. 
5  The current discussion how to sketch out the methodological position and how to name it is 
more or less inconsistent respectively ambiguous. Bessy (2002a) labels the methodological 
position as “complex methodological individualism”, Vercueil (1997) speaks of “methodo-
logical individualism of the type of a relational totality”, Defalvard (1992) labels it a “mod-
ernized holism”, Raveaud (2008) characterizes EC as a “methodological holism”, Postel 
(2003) labels it as “modernized methodological individualism”, Combemale (2001) argues 
that EC has a classical position of MI, Rose (1990) speaks of an MI in “a not extreme 
form”. 
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valid research findings an empirical approach has to respect this methodic 
holism. Otherwise, the ways the research objects are constructed and data are 
produced are incompatible with theoretical notions. The reason for this is that 
instruments and research practices have to respect the ontological claims made 
by the theory and have to fulfill the claims how reality can be “measured”. It 
has to be pointed out that there is a plurality of possible methodic holisms. One 
reason is that it depends on the chosen theory. Another reason is that one can 
imagine different possible sets of compatible instruments that enable to trans-
late one theory into coherent research practice. One can argue that the meth-
odological standpoint of EC realizes this kind of methodic holism.6  
But this position has to be systematically reconstructed from the writings of 
the representatives of EC. The approach of the économie des conventions has 
been formed almost three decades ago in the Paris Region. Most writings about 
EC regard the issue “L’économie des conventions” of the economic journal 
Revue économique (40 (2) from 1989) as the “official” foundational document 
of this approach. But there have been some important publications before 
which also contribute to the methodological positioning of EC (as Salais and 
Thévenot 1986; Thévenot 1986), so these will be included in this review here 
as well as contributions to the discussion about the methodological standpoint 
of EC since the 1990s.7 The reason for the need to reconstruct the methodo-
logical position derives from the very few remarks in existing papers from this 
approach addressing the topic of the underlying methodological position. As 
Hervé Defalvard (1992, 127) mentioned, the collective introduction (Dupuy et 
al. 1989) of the foundational issue of Revue économique only comprises two 
paragraphs addressing the methodological standpoint of EC. In 1989 it is stated 
by the six authors of this programmatic introduction (Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Fran-
çois Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereau, André Orléan, Robert Salais and 
Laurent Thévenot) that the new approach is still committed to MI but includes 
collective entities and collective objects. This methodological statement in this 
introductory article is not precise enough. 
In the 1990s the discussion about the methodological standpoint intensified, 
starting with contributions from outside and from the margins of this approach 
(as Defalvard 1992, 2000; Vercueil 1997; Postel 1998; Combemale 2001; 
Raveaud 2005, 2008).8 
                                                             
6  Hervé Defalvard (1992, 131) uses the notion of “coupling” (French “couplage”) to depict 
this methodic holism between methods used and the ontological claims which are entailed 
(explicitly or implicitly) in the theoretical thinking of the EC. This is much more than just a 
kind of loose affinity. 
7  See for a German written systematic outline of the EC-approach Diaz-Bone (forthcoming). 
8  It is to mention that in the French philosophy of economics and in the French social phi-
losophy there is an intense discussion about the epistemological foundations of economics 
and society. Here the positions of Arnaud Berthoud, Vincent Descombes (1997) and Pierre 
Livet (1994, 2005) are influential for EC. 
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This article introduces first some theoretical notions to work out central on-
tological claims of the EC. Then the discussion about the methodological 
standpoint of the EC will be reconsidered. There are several evident influences 
stemming from the French context in which the EC was developed – namely 
the pragmatic turn in French social sciences since the 1980s (Dosse 1999; 
Nachi 2006; Corcuff 2007).9 Here, the so-called actor network theory (devel-
oped by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, in short: ANT) co-evolved with the 
EC. Together with ANT the EC-approach includes objects and cognitive de-
vices in its theorizing. But also structuralist thinking was (and is) still promi-
nent. The specific methodological position of EC as a “third way” between MI 
and MH integrates methodological positions of pragmatism and structuralism 
in a new way.10 After that the Weberian approach is used at the end as refer-
ence because Weber introduces an interpretative methodology not only for 
sociology but also for socio-historical analysis. It is argued on the one side, that 
EC’s methodological position shares important positions with the methodologi-
cal position of Max Weber. This is one of the reasons why the approach of EC 
is highly relevant for socio-historical research not only in the field of economic 
sociology or economics. But on the other side the EC differs from Weber’s 
epistemological and methodological positions. 
2. EC as a New Pragmatist Institutionalism 
Since the 1980s, the approach of the économie des conventions was developed 
in the Paris Region. It can be regarded as a research-network between econo-
mists, sociologists, statisticians, and historians who have worked out a new and 
heterodox (to mainstream economy) approach of a pragmatist institutionalism 
(and still continue to do so). The EC starts with a break with neoclassical eco-
nomics by stating that actors are not isolated individuals with an a priori ration-
ality but need a social environment and capacities to apply a plurality of possi-
ble rationalities. For the EC the name giving notion of convention is important. 
Conventions are not to be confused with arbitrary “standards” or traditional 
customs or ad hoc agreements. Conventions are understood as shared interper-
sonal logics how to coordinate and to evaluate actions, individuals and objects 
in situations of uncertainty (Eymard-Duvernay 1989; Thévenot 1989; Salais 
1989, 2007; Storper and Salais 1997; Diaz-Bone 2009a). Conventions are 
socio-cultural resources for the coordination between actors. The EC relates 
these convention-based coordinations to the collective intentionality towards 
                                                             
9  For a systematic overview of French pragmatist sociology see also the contribution in the 
book series “Raisons pratiques” which has been published by the Ecole des Hautes Etudes 
en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris since 1984 and has now more than 20 volumes. 
10  For this perspective of a new methodological position or a third way see also Dosse (1999), 
Livet (2005) and Raveaud (2008). 
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production and products. Conventions therefore are the foundations for differ-
ent possible ways how to coordinate in the sphere of economic production, 
distribution and consumption and how to realize a common way how to evalu-
ate the quality of products. The EC assumes a radical plurality of existing con-
ventions. Actors are capable to judge the appropriateness of conventions and 
they are able to switch between conventions or to work out compromises be-
tween different conventions. In fact, in most situations a plurality of conven-
tions is virtually present as a plurality of possible logics of coordination. The 
most important conventions in the sphere of the economy are conventions as 
the market convention, the industrial convention, the domestic convention, the 
“green” convention. Meanwhile, the studies of the EC identified more than a 
dozen different conventions. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006) for-
mulated some of the theoretical notions which were developed within the EC-
approach. In their book “On justification” (which appeared first in France in 
1987) the authors made evident that this approach is a general pragmatist ap-
proach for social sciences and it is not limited to the analysis of economic 
phenomena. 
The EC criticizes especially the economic neo-institutionalism which was 
developed by Oliver Williamson (1985) and Douglass North (1990, 1991, 
1993). North regards rules (formal institutions) as external constraints for eco-
nomic action.11 Bénédicte Reynaud (following Herbert Simon and Amartya 
Sen) has pointed out that rules can be seen as incomplete devices for action, 
thus they are not determining economic action and coordination (Reynaud 
2004). Instead of being determined by rules, capable actors use conventions in 
order to interpret rules and to apply them to situations. In a pragmatist perspec-
tive actors handle rules to reach a solution for a demand of coordination under 
condition of uncertainty. Thereby rules are enacted in the process of action and 
they become internal devices which are no longer adequately conceived as 
external constraints. The meaning of rules is identical to their convention-based 
practical usage. (Here Reynaud brings in the pragmatist conclusions of the 
linguistic philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Pierre Livet).12  
                                                             
11  North (1991) differentiates between formal rules (laws, property rights, constitutions) and 
informal constraints (codes of conduct, custom, traditions). So rules are not the only form 
of institution in his theory. But it is important to note, that institutions for North are external 
constraints to action (North 1990, 4). Bessy and Favereau (2003) value North’s notion of 
institution as an open concept, because it includes formal as well as informal structures. 
Another parallel between EC and North’s theory is seen in the link between institution and 
cognition (Bessy 2003, 40). In both theories institutions are a cognitive reality (see also De-
quech 2005). As Bessy notes, the shared notion of cognition is not the one of an autono-
mous individual, but the notion of “distributed cognition” as a collective institutional reality 
(Bessy 2003, 42).  
12  It is the linguistic work of Pierre Livet (1994) about speech acts and meaning which be-
came important in EC. Livet delivered important insights of pragmatist linguistics to EC. 
Robert Salais made me aware of this. For a detailed account see Diaz-Bone (forthcoming). 
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In one regard actors are seen as capable because they can apply conventions 
and they are able to justify themselves. They also act on the argumentative 
basis of these conventions. But in another regard they are considered as “in-
complete” because they are not equipped with a universal and complete “ra-
tionality”. From the perspective of EC actor’s rationality is limited, situated, 
interpretative and argumentative (Bessis et al. 2006). It is limited because no 
actor has the cognitive capacities to process all available and relevant informa-
tion. Cognition is not limited to the individual brain but relies on cognitive 
devices in the socio-cultural environment.13 Therefore, the cognition of coordi-
nating actors is regarded as “situated” which means it is co-produced by the 
formattings in which information is organized, retrieved and displayed for the 
actors (Laville 2000). In situations, actors have to interpret the situation and the 
actions of others. Here they use conventions to do this interpretation assuming 
others are doing the same. In the case of crisis (of coordination) or criticism (of 
the quality or worth of an object or an individual) actors use convention-based 
arguments to criticize others or to justify themselves. The following illustration 
depicts some of the main notions of EC. 
                                                             
13  Here the works of Hutchins (1995) and Norman (1988) are important influences for the 
analysis of “situated cognition”. 
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3. Situations as Units of Analysis 
Why can one speak of “situationalism”? Situations are the units of analysis, not 
individuals. EC tries to understand the empirical logic of coordination in real 
situations from the inside (Salais 2007, 97) which is the perspective of the 
actors – not the perspective of the scientist who models actors.  
To understand what economic actors do, we must examine quite closely the 
situations in which they find themselves. Even when actors describe their own 
actions in terms of laws (as in the everyday use of the language of the market), 
our theories do not have to accept those descriptions as ‘truthful’ (or lawful) – 
nor do they authorize rejecting them as irrelevant falsehoods. Instead, we must 
analyze the extent to which actors actually use such descriptions or hypotheses 
to represent their practical problems, and how, as forms of lived social live, 
the descriptions affect the real course of economic action, irrespective of their 
‘truthfulness’. Our starting point is therefore the individual’s interpretative ef-
fort, a strong form of action in and of itself. (Storper and Salais 1997, 15) 
It is in situations that capable actors have to use conventions to interpret the 
actions of others and the appropriateness of conventions and conventional 
forms.  
However, this appropriateness of conventions cannot be judged by an iso-
lated individual. Individuals need the involvement into common knowledge 
about existing conventions as ways of sharing forms of interpretation. From the 
perspective of the EC the possibility of collective intentionality cannot be re-
duced to the sum of individual intentions. 
The situation is also characterized by uncertainty about the outcomes of the 
interactive process. Interaction is seen as not determined by individual inten-
tions or by external constraint (except in situations of violence). So, actors face 
uncertainty in situations of coordination and they have to deal with it. 
Furthermore, the concept of “situation” is not restricted to face-to-face-
situations. Situations are complex arrangements or constellations of objects, 
cognitive formats, problems (coordinations to be realized), institutional set-
tings, persons, concepts. Such situations are historically embedded into society 
in which conventions are already established because they have demonstrated 
on the long run their usefulness. It is the level of the situation where EC inte-
grates micro- and macrolevel realities because in situations they realize their 
effects and their interwoven and interrelated ontologies. It is also the methodo-
logical perspective on situations where the positions of MI and MH are trans-
gressed.  
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4. Neither Methodological Individualism 
nor Methodological Holism 
To position an approach for the analysis of the economy today, it is still impor-
tant to relate it to MI since the methodological thinking of MI is highly influen-
tial in mainstream economics – especially in neoclassical economic theory. The 
methodological thinking of MH is a classical foundation of social science and 
especially French sociology since the programmatic work of Émile Durkheim 
(1950). These two contemporary positions are important schemata for the ex-
planation of social phenomena and for modeling relations between the mi-
crolevel and the macrolevel. They are both positioned at the different ends of 
an opposition. Meanwhile, alternatives exist, but they critically relate them-
selves to these two first schemata.  
Joseph Agassi (1960) followed Karl Popper in representing a strong indi-
vidual methodology. He sketched schematically the arguments of MI and MH.  
 
Methodological Holism Methodological Individualism 
1 Society is the “whole” which is more 
than its parts (holism) 
Only individuals have aims and interests 
(individualism) 
2 “Society” affects the individual’s aims 
(collectivism). 
The individual behaves in a way adequate to 
his aim, given his circumstances 
(rationality principle) 
3 The social set-up influences and 
constrains the individual’s behaviour 
(institutional analysis). 
The social set-up is changeable as a result of 
individuals’ action 
(institutional reform) 
 
The core argument of MI is that there are only individuals, their aims and their 
decisions as explaining principles. MI denies the existence of superindividual 
realities and collective entities with aims or intentions. For MI there is no genu-
ine reality of any totality or any superindividual entity. Here, the relation of 
micro- and macrolevel is conceived as a mere aggregation of individual states 
or decisions to collective outcomes. The latter can be explained as the result of 
rational behaviour of many individuals. The core argument of MH is that su-
perindividual and collective entities are required to explain social coordination 
and individual behaviour which is regarded not to be autonomous. Here, the 
macrolevel structures and influences the microlevel. Rationality is not a prop-
erty of individuals but a socio-historical phenomenon with varying properties 
depending on the cultural and institutional structures. The classical objections 
against both positions are that MI is a kind of reductionism, reducing social 
sciences to psychological analysis unable to include institutions in theorizing 
(and explanations) while overemphasizing individual rationality, and individual 
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spontaneity, MH is criticized for ignoring agency while overemphasizing struc-
tural stability.14  
The founding group of the six authors of the EC differs to some extent in 
their methodological position, although, all agree to overcome the classical MI 
of neoclassical economics. (Olivier Favereau is said to be nearest to MI and 
André Orléan is said to have the strongest affinity to MH.)15 In the introduction 
to a recent collection this group makes a more precise statement (Eymard-
Duvernay et al. 2006).  
Today, EC has itself distanced from simple versions of MI and MH. Be-
cause rationality is modeled as limited, situated, interpretative and argumenta-
tive, conventions and cognitive devices (collective cognitive dispositives and 
cognitive formats) have to provide the foundation as much as the instrumenta-
tion for individual agency or collective coordination. An example: In order to 
make individual decisions in a market, the market as social institution (includ-
ing money and collective agreements about the quality of traded goods) must 
preexist. Afterwards, market coordination is possible. So, MI is not any more 
the methodological “confession” of this group. But the group also criticizes 
MH. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) make a clear cut by inventing a form of 
analysis of situations which breaks with the Durkheimian concept of the social 
group and postulated entities at the macrolevel (here EC has an anti-
Durkheimian standpoint). So EC distances itself from this version of MH by 
criticizing the assumptions of pre-established social stability and of social 
groupings as the important explanatory principle. 
5. Beyond Pragmatism and Structuralism 
EC represents the central part of the pragmatic turn in French social sciences 
(Dosse 1999; Diaz-Bone and Thévenot 2010). It is argued that pragmatist and 
structuralist positions are influential precursors for this pragmatic turn – there-
fore for the methodological standpoint of EC. 
Pragmatism represents the older influence. The classical writings of this first 
American intellectual movement invented a new methodological and a new 
epistemological position (James 1907, 1909, 1912; Dewey 1925, 1929, 1938). 
Pragmatism was developed to reconcile classical British empirical philosophy, 
continental humanism and the insights of Darwinism. There are some related 
fundamental elements of pragmatist thinking. 
                                                             
14  The so called institutional individualism proposed by Agassi (1960) is criticized by Defal-
vard (1992) because Agassi has to assume (a prioiri) autonomous individuals who decide 
how to use institutions. 
15  In a similar manner Postel (1998) opposes Favereau (MI) to Thévenot (MH). 
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1) No dualisms. Pragmatism rejects the classical dualisms of continental phi-
losophy (such as the division of body and mind or the dualism of subject 
and object). 
2) No a priori. Pragmatism also rejects the Kantian notions of a priori such as 
the universal anthropological structures of pure reason. 
3) No epistemological skepticism. Everything that can be experienced is real.  
4) Dynamical world view. The physical, biological and social world is in con-
stant evolutionary flow. Ideas of constant properties (such as natural laws) 
are just working hypotheses. 
5) Radical pluralism. The physical, biological and social world is structured 
through an existing plurality of principles. 
6) Viability. Living individuals are embedded in an (physical and cultural) 
environment in which they learn and try to adapt to this environment. Living 
is the successful hypotheses of how to learn and to adapt. This relation be-
tween living individuals and environment is interactive and dynamic. 
7) Permanent fitting and testing. As knowledge, values and cognitive structures 
are practically gained and used, they are permanently tested in social prac-
tice. As long as they are useful for this practice, they are true i.e. viable ele-
ments of the empirical world.16 
8) There is no universal a priori methodology for empirical research. Method-
ology has to be built up within applied empirical research. It is “operational 
a priori” (Dewey) when it is the systematized result of foregoing successful 
research.  
Classical and modern pragmatist thinking was continually present in American 
microsociology (ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism), in cognitive 
sociology (Conein 2005; Conein and Thévenot eds. 1997; Thévenot 2006, 
2007, 2011) and in the philosophy of language (Livet 1994). The latter two 
prepared the foundation for the French pragmatist social sciences. Their recep-
tion in France was the transmitting mechanism of pragmatist thinking. 
Structuralism was one of the greatest paradigms in the humanities and social 
sciences in France. Originally developed in linguistics, structural analysis was 
modified and soon applied by Lévi-Strauss to the analysis of culture, of classi-
fications, and of social structure in ethnological research. Structuralism never 
was a coherent scientific paradigm, but a scientific movement, which postu-
lated the existence of a systematic organization of culture and society to be 
uncovered through structuralist research. Prominent representatives of structur-
alism as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu were influenced by 
the historical analysis of sciences undertaken by the French tradition of episte-
mology (Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem and with some deviations 
from the former Michel Serres). They proclaimed the specific epistemological 
                                                             
16  This position is reflected in the importance which is given to tests in the EC. 
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practice which was to break with everyday experience and everyday notions 
(postulates which are in accordance with the sociology of Émile Durkheim) 
and to reconstruct empirical phenomena by means of instruments, compatible 
with the scientific approach in use. The cultural and social structures are re-
garded as being unconscious collective realities which coin thinking, perceiv-
ing and acting of the members of collectives. Structuralist methodology has to 
be appropriate to reconstruct these unconscious collective realities. The soci-
ologist Pierre Bourdieu extended the earlier forms of structuralism by exceed-
ing its narrow methodological holism and integrating a dualism of practice and 
structure (Bourdieu 1972, 1979, 1980; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; de Fornel 
and Ogien eds. 2011). Practice is seen as being structured by the (unconscious) 
social structure and (re)producing it through the everyday practice of different 
life styles.  
Again, there are some related fundamental elements of structuralist thinking 
(especially derived from the work of Bourdieu) which can be seen as starting 
points for EC. 
1) Methodic holism. The coherence of empirical theory and its method must be 
respected and reflected. Instruments and research strategies must be applied 
in a reflexive way to reconstruct the research object; these instruments must 
replicate the metaphysics brought in by the theory. 
2) Dualism of structure and practice. To overcome MH it is important to relate 
it to the forms of practice which are in turn related to it and contribute to the 
reproduction of the superindividual structures. 
3) Reconstruction of structures. Social, cultural and cognitive structures (clas-
sifications) have to be methodologically reconstructed – like grammars are 
reconstructed in linguistics. 
4) Cognitive structures – especially classifications – have to be analyzed in the 
context of social and institutional structures, in their relation to behavior 
(practice) and in the historical dimension in which they co-evolved. Some of 
the researchers of the EC-approach were trained in the Bourdieu-paradigm. 
This was the transmitting mechanism.17  
But the sociology of Bourdieu was also a problematic reference for the forming 
pragmatist sociology in France, because Bourdieu and his followers rejected 
some of the theoretical and methodological positions of the EC-approach and 
vice versa. The following positions of the EC are at the same time (more or less 
overt) critical statements against Bourdieu’s sociology.18 
                                                             
17  Bourdieu had immediate influence on many researchers of the EC because Bourdieu gave 
courses at the ENSAE (École Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration Économi-
que), which is the Grande École that prepares for the INSEE. 
18  And it has to be added that there is also a critical review of Bourdieu’s critic of the eco-
nomical theory by Favereau. He accuses Bourdieu’s economic sociology of being another 
kind of scientific orthodoxical thinking (Favereau 2001). 
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1) Actors have reflexive-critical capacities themselves and are not uncon-
sciously exposed to the macrolevel. The social structures at the macrolevel 
are not the dominant explaining principle for social reality, action and coor-
dination. 
2) Scientists do not have an exceptional epistemological standpoint compared 
to “normal” actors. 
3) There is a plurality of structuring principles not only one (as Bourdieu’s 
hierarchical system of notions of social space, field and different forms of 
capital assumes). 
4) Action and agency cannot be explained by incorporated dispositions (as 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus assumes) or individual intentions, but by using 
the instrumentations and (cognitive) dispositions present in situations which 
do depend mainly on conventions and capacities. 
The EC-approach has integrated these influences of both precursors. While 
pragmatism is weak in explaining social structures and structuralism is (or at 
least has been for a long time) weak in including agency, EC combines meth-
odological elements of both.19 EC has become the most important heterodox 
approach in French socio-economic institutionalism. Its methodological posi-
tion corresponds to its theoretical position. The consequence is that the research 
reconstructs the complex practice of the interplay between coordinating actors 
and conventions. This is done in historical-genealogical perspective – analyz-
ing the co-evolution of the arrangement of practices, cognitive devices and 
conventions. Examples are Salais et al. (1986), Salais (1985), Thévenot (1990) 
and also Boltanski (1982). Many empirical studies use comparisons to bring the 
differences between the arrangements to the fore and to understand these ar-
rangements (examples for national comparisons Storper and Salais 1997; La-
mont and Thévenot eds. (2000); Bessy et al. 2001; examples for comparisons in 
branches are Boisard and Letablier 1987, 1989; Biencourt and Urrutiager 
2002). Explanation is not done by statistical modeling or the logical forms of 
induction or deduction. Explanation is achieved through an interpretative proc-
ess of exploring the logic actors apply in order to coordinate themselves in the 
process of production (of any kind of products, as statistical data, consumer 
goods etc.).  
6. Parallels to the Weberian Approach 
As Gilles Raveaud (2008) has pointed out, Max Weber is an ally for heterodox 
economic theorizing. Weber (1985) claimed that sociological methodology 
                                                             
19  But Bourdieu was here a precursor, because he already integrated some pragmatic elements 
into his constructivist structuralist theory to overcome earlier structuralist positions of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (de Fornel and Ogien eds. 2011). 
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should understand social action through the interpretation of the meaning of 
action (“deutend verstehen”) from the actor’s perspective and explain its inner 
causality (“ursächlich erklären”). Here explanation is closely linked to the 
researcher’s understanding of actor’s interpretation (as a scientific interpreta-
tion of actor’s interpretation). Thus “verstehen” (understanding) and “erklären” 
(explaining) are linked. 
Christian Bessy has highlighted one parallel between EC and Weber’s 
methodological claims. Bessy (2011) argues that two main strategies of institu-
tional analysis can be differentiated. One strategy conceives institutions as 
external constraints to action and models the impact of these constraints as 
causal factor on action. Here institutions are exogenous factors to action. The 
other strategy places the interpretative processes of actors in the centre. Institu-
tions are conceived as enacted by actors and the meaning of these institutions 
for actors is reconstructed. Actors contribute to the interpretative process and to 
the following enactment of the performative reality of institutions. Institutions 
are not given causal factors but endogenous to action. The parallel between 
Weber’s perspective and the EC-approach lies in this latter strategy to under-
stand institutions as endogenous to action (see also Salais 1998a). 
Weber proposed to construct ideal types. They are neither empirical cases 
nor average types. Ideal types are analytical constructions of types of rational-
ity which are constructed to represent a coherent way of interpretation and 
acting. The task of sociology was to develop systems of such ideal types and to 
infer general rules of social processes.  
The quality of these ideal types as constructions can be seen in their capacity 
to interpret series of actions as being integrated by coherent meaning (“Sinn-
adäquanz”) and in their capacity to interpret that action follows rules and that 
the interpretation of a series of actions is compelling (“Kausaladäquanz”).  
Weber demonstrated his interpretative strategy in the historical analysis of 
the emergence of capitalism from the religion of Calvinism (Weber 1988a). 
Weber identified an ideal type whose religious motivation led him to discipline 
all aspects of his way of life and to aim for economic success (profit) as a di-
vine sign to be a member of the chosen few.  
The conventions – constructed in empirical analyses – have much in com-
mon with Weber’s notion of ideal type. But an important difference remains: 
conventions as logics of coordination and evaluation are not scientific construc-
tions. They are – as ideal forms of coordination and evaluation – virtually pre-
sent for all competent actors. They are a kind of “common knowledge” for all 
members of a society (Dupuy 1989). “Virtually” indicates here that conven-
tions must not be purely realized in material form (for instance as organiza-
tional form), but that conventions are socio-cultural and then socio-cognitive 
resources which are empirically present in situations as possible ways of coor-
dination and evaluation. Storper and Salais (1997) therefore use the notion of 
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“possible worlds” which are the resources for coordination and evaluation 
actors in the empirical world to construct real worlds. 
In his sociology of religion, Weber showed that economy has normative 
foundations. In the example of Calvinism, this religious doctrine delivered 
normative foundations for a specific type of capitalism and economic action. 
The EC-approach also postulates that conventions can be seen as an empirical 
existing “ordinary normativity” as the basis for the economy (Eymard-
Duvernay et al. 2006a, 2006b; Reynaud and Richebé 2007). Weber’s analytical 
interest was also to explain the historical development of different forms of 
economy (Weber 1991; Swedberg 1998). Weber’s approach is to make evident 
that cultural systems can induce the socio-historical evolution of the (material) 
economic organization (Weber 1988b) and it shows that in order to explain 
modern capitalism and its institutions, the foregoing upcoming of religious 
doctrine has to be studied. This is another parallel to the EC-approach.20  
7. The Complexities of EC’s Methodological Position 
The use of the Weberian approach as reference appears helpful to point out the 
interpretative character of the methodological standpoint of the EC. But the EC 
does not focus solely ideal types. Coordinating actors have to deal with the 
empirical reality of a plurality of conventions, they have to cope with conflicts 
between conventions and they have to work out compromises. This is a first 
complexity (horizontal plurality of conventions). There is a second one. EC 
integrates the different levels as they are enacted in situational coordination and 
evaluation (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 2006a; Thévenot 1997). The methodologi-
cal reason for this concentration on situations is that institutions are conceived 
as internal to coordination and evaluation (Salais 2007; Bessy 2002b, 2011; 
Bessy and Favereau 2003). They are not regarded as external constraints as in 
neo-institutional theory from Williamson (1985) and North (1990). The second 
complexity comes in when the different levels – starting from personal en-
gagement (Thévenot 1994, 2006, 2007) to the level of state oriented coordina-
tion and evaluation (Salais 1998a, 2007; Storper and Salais 1997; Salais and 
Villeneuve eds. 2004) – are simultaneously enacted in situations (vertical plu-
rality of conventions). The evolution of this double complexity (as two com-
bined forms of plurality) is to be explained (the explanandum) – not the evolu-
tion of separated ideal types. EC aims to understand the practices that “make 
things hold together” and to interpret the logic of the constructed arrangement 
of practices, cognitive formats, conventions etc. Weber’s perspective was to 
                                                             
20  Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) also reconstructed conventions (they named them orders of 
worth) as cultural formations out of historical documents as Weber did in his sociology of 
religion. 
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focus on how culture and different forms of rationality (resulting from mem-
bership in social groups and institutions on the meso- or macrolevel) influence 
the behavior of individuals. As most sociologists after him, he separated a 
priori spheres of causes and consequences. The new French social sciences 
with EC and ANT at their centre withdraw from separating such spheres a 
priori.21 Instead, arrangements of humans, things, and cognitive concepts are 
regarded as networks out of which new phenomena emerge. The differentiation 
of causes and consequences is understood as an attribution within these net-
works. It is a social construction a posteriori. EC and ANT take objects in a 
new way seriously (Thévenot 1993, 1994). Objects participate in “socializing” 
that is objects are involved in constructive practices. The worth of objects and 
individuals is constructed in mutual processes of attributions. Objects are the 
bases for tests that proof the worth of individuals or their actions. And vice 
versa: the social meaning of objects (as products) is constructed by relating 
them to practices, concepts, cognitive formats. Latour postulates a methodo-
logical symmetry in the explanation of ontologies. Instead of assuming the 
existence (ontology) of society and to explain afterwards the “social construc-
tion of nature” through social practices, ANT explores the processes of mutual 
construction (Latour 1993, 2005).  
The complexity of the methodological position of EC is enhanced because 
EC avoids an a priori monocausality and explores the attribution of causality as 
a process in the empirical reality under study. This is a classical pragmatist 
research strategy.  
Therefore, a plurality of research techniques and research strategies is used. 
As in the social studies of sciences (STS, which was mainly influenced by 
ANT), ethnographic methods are applied in the analysis of these complex proc-
esses of the construction of categories, and the worth of objects and individu-
als. The early analysis of categorizing in the field of official statistics already 
used qualitative interviews to explore the interpretative processes of actor’s 
using categories or constructing classifications (Eymard-Duvernay and 
Thévenot 1986; Salais et al. 1986; Boltanski and Thévenot 1983; Desrosières 
and Thévenot 2002; Thévenot 1983). But there are also statistical techniques 
like exploratory factor analysis (in the French version of correspondence analy-
sis) which are suitable to identify the results of constructive practices (Salais 
1992; Rivaud-Danset and Salais 1992; Salais 1998b, Storper and Salais 1997). 
In fact, these techniques where introduced by Bourdieu and his group for the 
                                                             
21  The theories of ANT and Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) were developed in mutual orienta-
tion (Dosse 1999; Nachi 2006; Corcuff 2007). Because the theoretical work that was done 
by Boltanski and Thévenot is part of the EC, ANT and EC share foundational theoretical 
positions. But Luc Boltanski himself is not a core member of EC as Laurent Thévenot is. 
And he still confesses to be a structuralist (as he did at the Congress of Sociology in Frank-
furt 2010). 
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structuralist analysis of social fields. Another technique is the study and inter-
pretation of documents to identify implicit categories and conventions and to 
infer from documents to the logics of practices (see for example the contribu-
tions in Thévenot ed. 1986 and in Boltanski and Thévenot eds. 1989 as well as 
the contributions of Luciani and Salais 1992, and Boltanski and Thévenot 
1983, 2006). The group around Eymard-Duvernay studied job announcements 
to identify the underlying conventions (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 1997; 
Bessy and Larquier 2000). Caroline Dahlberg (2010) studied the convention-
based justification of the self-regulatory organizations of advertising using 
qualitative interviews.22  
One can argue that discourse analysis can be used in this approach to recon-
struct quality conventions as deeper structures of the knowledge order in the 
economy (Diaz-Bone 2009c). There can be found different statements of repre-
sentatives of EC who point out the importance of language use for the founda-
tion of knowledge on conventions (Thévenot 2007, 2011; Eymard-Duvernay 
2009). All in all, EC tries to apply a coherent arsenal of research techniques to 
translate the assumed ontological complexities and pluralities into a coherent 
research strategy. 
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